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Consistent House Allocation∗
Lars Ehlers† Bettina Klaus‡
October 2005
Abstract
In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing,
jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compen-
sations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness,
and efficiency must be an efficient generalized priority rule; i.e., it must adapt to an acyclic
priority structure, except—maybe—for up to three agents in each object’s priority ordering.
JEL Classification: D63, D70
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1 Introduction
In real life we often face the problem of allocating heterogeneous indivisible objects (for in-
stance, schools, housing, jobs, or offices) among a group of agents (for instance, students, home-
less, workers, or professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. Agents have strict
preferences over objects and remaining unassigned. An assignment is an allocation of the ob-
jects to the agents such that every agent receives at most one object. A rule is a systematic
way of solving these assignment problems that are classically called house allocation problems
(the implicit assumption being that each agent only needs at most one house to live in). The
search for “good” house allocation rules, i.e., rules with desirable properties, is the subject of
many recent papers, for instance, Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998, 1999), Bogomolnaia and
Moulin (2001), Chambers (2004), Ehlers (2002), Ehlers and Klaus (2003,2005), Ehlers, Klaus,
and Pa´pai (2002), Ergin (2000), Kesten (2004a,b), Pa´pai (2000), and Svensson (1999). Recent
articles that pursue a similar research agenda in closely related models with monetary compen-
sations are Miyagawa (2001), Ohseto (2006), Schummer (2000), Svensson (2004), Svensson and
Larsson (2002), and Thomson (2003).1
In most real life problems “priorities” naturally arise. For example, in school choice students
who live closer to a school and/or have siblings attending a school have higher priority to be
admitted at that school (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003). When apartments are allocated,
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the homeless who have been waiting longer have higher priority to be assigned an apartment
(similarly for the placement of students at colleges).
Balinski and So¨nmez (1999) were the first to formulate the assignment problem based on
priorities. The agents’ priorities for a certain object are captured by an ordering of the agents.
A priority structure is a profile specifying for each object a priority ordering. Given the agents’
priorities, it is natural to require that the assignment does not violate any priorities. This means
that there should be no agent who – conditional on higher priority – envies another agent (for
receiving a better object). A rule adapts to a priority structure if it always chooses an assignment
that does not violate any priorities.
It is well known, that for any profile of agents’ preferences the assignment obtained from
applying Gale and Shapley’s (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm Pareto dominates any other
assignment which does not violate any priorities. This algorithm is called the “best” rule among
the rules adapting to a priority structure. Unfortunately the best rule may not be efficient.
Ergin (2002) shows that “acyclicity” of the priority structure is equivalent to various properties
(efficiency, group strategy-proofness,2 and consistency) of the induced best rules.
Consistency, our main property, is a condition of stability when the set of agents and re-
sources may change. To understand this property, suppose that after objects are allocated
according to a rule, some agents leave the economy with their allotments, and the remaining
agents “reassign” among themselves the remaining objects. What if the same rule is applied to
their “reassignment problem”? A rule is considered “unstable” or “inconsistent” if its reassign-
ment differs from its original assignment to the remaining agents.3
Our main result shows that a rule that satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness,4 and effi-
ciency must be an efficient generalized priority rule; i.e., it is efficient and adapts to an acyclic
priority structure, except – maybe – for up to three agents in each object’s priority ordering.
Therefore, our properties imply that the assignment of objects must be based on an acyclic gen-
eralized priority structure and the rule chooses the same allocations as the associated deferred
acceptance algorithm.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and the main properties. Sec-
tion 3 we devote to (generalized) priority rules, two examples, and the main result. We conclude
in Section 4 with a brief discussion of our results and a comparison to Ehlers and Klaus (2005).
The proof of the main result is given in the Appendix.
2 House Allocation
Let P denote the set of potential agents. We assume that P is finite and contains at least four
agents.5 Let P denote the set of all subsets of P containing at least two agents. Let K denote
the set of potential real objects. The set K can be finite or infinite. Not receiving any real
2By group strategy-proofness no group of agents can profit by joint misrepresentation of their preferences such
that all members of the group weakly gain and at least one member of the group strictly gains.
3Ergin (2000) studies consistency for the house allocation problem in various combinations with efficiency,
converse consistency, neutrality, and anonymity. Here, converse consistency pertains to the opposite operation
of consistency ; see Thomson (2004). By neutrality, the names of the objects do not matter. By anonymity, the
names of the agents do not matter.
4No agent can manipulate the allocation to his/her advantage by lying about his/her preferences.
5Example 2 considers |P | = 3 and clarifies why our main result has “no bite” in this case. Our results remain
unchanged if P is infinite.
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object is called “receiving the null object.” The null object, denoted by 0, does not belong to
K and is available in any economy. Let H denote the set of all finite subsets of K.
Each agent i ∈ P is equipped with a strict preference relation Ri over all objects K ∪{0}. In
other words, Ri is a linear order over K ∪ {0}. Given x, y ∈ K ∪ {0}, x Pi y means that agent i
strictly prefers x to y under Ri. Let R denote the set of all linear orders over K ∪ {0}. Given
N ⊆ P , let RN denote the set of all (preference) profiles R = (Ri)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N ,
Ri ∈ R. Given N ⊆ P , i ∈ N , R ∈ RN , and K ′ ⊆ K ∪ {0}, let Ri|K′ denote the restriction of
Ri to K ′ and R|K′ = (Ri|K′)i∈N . An economy (or house allocation problem) consists of a set of
agents, their preferences, and a finite set of real objects which have to be allocated among them.
Formally, an economy is a triple (N,R,H) where N ∈ P, R ∈ RN , and H ∈ H. We suppress
the set of agents and write (R,H) instead of (N,R,H). Let EN denote the set of all economies
with the set of agents equal to N .
When allocating objects each agent receives one object. The null object is the only object
which can be assigned to several agents. Formally, given a set of agents N , an allocation is a
list a = (ai)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N , ai ∈ K ∪ {0}, and none of the real objects in K is
assigned to more than one agent. Note that not all real objects in K have to be assigned. An
(allocation) rule is a function that assigns an allocation to every economy. Formally, a rule ϕ
chooses for all N ∈ P and all economies (R,H) ∈ EN an allocation ϕ(R,H) such that for all
i ∈ N , ϕi(R,H) ∈ H ∪ {0}. Given i ∈ N , we call ϕi(R,H) the allotment of agent i at ϕ(R,H).
Next, we introduce our main properties for rules.
First, the rule chooses only (Pareto) efficient allocations.
Efficiency: For all N ∈ P and all (R,H) ∈ EN , there is no allocation a = (ai)i∈N such that for
all i ∈ N , ai ∈ H ∪ {0} and ai Ri ϕi(R), and for some j ∈ N , aj Pj ϕj(R,H).
Given N ∈ P, R ∈ RN , and M ⊆ N , let RM denote the profile (Ri)i∈M . It is the restriction
of profile R to the subset of agents M . We also use the notation R−i = RN\{i}. For example,
(R¯i, R−i) denotes the profile obtained from R by replacing Ri by R¯i.
Second, no agent ever benefits from misrepresenting his/her preference relation.
Strategy-Proofness: For all N ∈ P, all (R,H) ∈ EN , all i ∈ N , and all R¯i ∈ R, ϕi(R,H) Ri
ϕi((R¯i, R−i),H).
Our last property is a stability condition. Consistency6 requires that if some agents leave an
economy with their allotments, then the rule should allocate the remaining objects among the
agents who did not leave in the same way as in the original economy.
Consistency: For all N,M ∈ P such that M ⊆ N , all (R,H) ∈ EN , and all i ∈M ,
ϕi(R,H) = ϕi
(
RM ,H\(∪j∈N\M{ϕj(R,H)})
)
.
Remark 1. Strategy-proofness and consistency imply that only preferences over objects that
are present in an economy matter for the final allocation. Formally, for any strategy-proof and
consistent rule ϕ, if two economies (N,R,H) and (N,R′,H) are such that R|H∪{0} = R′|H∪{0},
then ϕ(R,H) = ϕ(R′,H).7
6For a recent overview see Thomson (2004).
7Without loss of generality, let R′ = (R′i, R−i) for some i ∈ N . By strategy-proofness and Ri|H∪{0} = R′i|H∪{0},
we obtain ϕi(R,H) = ϕi(R
′,H). Thus, by consistency and (RN\{i}, H\{ϕi(R,H)}) = (R′N\{i}, H\{ϕi(R′, H)}),
we have for all j ∈ N\{i}, ϕj(R,H) = ϕj(RN\{i},H\{ϕi(R,H)}) = ϕj(R′, H). Hence, ϕ(R,H) = ϕ(R′, H).
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3 Generalized Priority Rules
We now introduce the idea that rules may adapt to priorities. In many situations “priorities”
naturally arise. For example, when offices are assigned to the members of a department, seniority
may matter; when apartments are assigned to graduate students, students who have been waiting
longer should come first; and for jobs, a candidate with higher qualification may be ranked above
lower qualified applicants.
We follow the notation and terminology introduced by Ergin (2002), who studies efficient
house allocation on the basis of priorities.
Given x ∈ K, let Âx denote a linear order over P . We call Âx a priority ordering for
object x. A priority structure is a profile Â = (Âx)x∈K specifying for each object a priority
ordering. Given N ∈ P, i ∈ N , R ∈ RN , x ∈ K, and a priority structure Â, an allocation a
violates the priority of i for x if there exists j ∈ N such that aj = x, i Âx j, and x Pi ai (i.e.,
i has higher priority for object x than j but j receives x and i envies j). A rule ϕ adapts to a
priority structure Â if for all N ∈ P and all (R,H) ∈ EN , ϕ(R,H) does not violate the priority
of any agent for any object.
We say that ϕ is a priority rule if there exists a priority structure Â such that ϕ adapts to Â.
Using a result from Balinski and So¨nmez (1999, Theorem 2) it follows that an efficient prior-
ity rule ϕ must be a so-called best rule; i.e., for each economy (R,H) ∈ EN , ϕ(R,H) is obtained
from applying the agents-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) to
the two-sided matching problem where the agents’ preferences are given by R and the “ob-
jects’ preferences” are given by the priority structure Â (see also Ergin, 2002, Proposition 1).
Ergin’s (2002, Theorem 1) main result essentially states that for best rules, efficiency, group
strategy-proofness, consistency, and the acyclicity of the priority structure are all equivalent.
While Ergin (2002) focuses on the class of rules that adapt to an exogenously given priority
structure, we consider the general class of all rules. We show that if a rule satisfies consistency,
strategy-proofness, and efficiency, then there must exist a priority structure that it “almost”
adapts to. In order to formalize this “almost” adaptation, we introduce generalized priority
rules next.
Let x ∈ K. We call a binary relation Âx a generalized priority ordering if
(i) Âx is transitive and antisymmetric and
(ii) there exists a set Qx ⊆ P such that |Qx| ≤ 3 and
(a) the restriction of Âx to the agents in P\Qx, denoted Âx|P\Qx , is complete (all agents in P
except for the agents in Qx can be completely ranked according to priority order Âx) and
(b) for all i ∈ P\Qx and all j ∈ Qx, i Âx j (agents in P\Qx are ranked above agents in Qx).
Note that any priority ordering is a generalized priority ordering since it satisfies the above
definition for Qx = ∅. Also, a generalized priority ordering that satisfies the above definition
with |Qx| = 1 is in fact a priority ordering.
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A generalized priority structure is a profile Â = (Âx)x∈K specifying for each object a gener-
alized priority ordering. We say that ϕ is a generalized priority rule if there exists a generalized
priority structure Â such that ϕ adapts to Â; i.e., it adapts to all priorities that are specified
in the generalized priority ordering, except possibly for priorities concerning an object x and
agents in Qx.
Theorem 1. If a rule satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency, then it is an
efficient generalized priority rule.
In order to be more specific about the structure of efficient generalized priority rules, we use
Ergin’s (2002, Theorem 1) result that a priority rule is efficient if and only if the underlying
priority structure is acyclic.
Let Â be a generalized priority structure. We say that Â has a cycle if there exist x, y ∈ K
and i, j, k ∈ P such that i Âx j Âx k Ây i. A generalized priority structure is acyclic if it has
no cycles. We can now rephrase Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. If a rule satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency, then it adapts
to an acyclic generalized priority structure Â.
Efficient priority rules satisfy all the axioms in Theorem 1. In the following example, we
demonstrate that the class of efficient generalized priority rules is strictly larger than the class
of efficient priority rules. In order to do so, we need some notation.
Let Â be a priority structure and ϕ be a priority rule adapting to Â. Then we call ϕ a serial
dictatorship if there exists an ordering Â∗ over P such that for all x ∈ K, Âx = Â∗. We denote
by ϕÂ∗ the serial dictatorship with ordering Â∗. It is easily checked that a serial dictatorship
satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency.
Example 1. Let Â1∗ and Â2∗ be the following orderings over P :
|P | Â1∗ |P | − 1 Â1∗ · · · Â1∗ 3 Â1∗ 2 Â1∗ 1;
|P | Â2∗ |P | − 1 Â2∗ · · · Â2∗ 3 Â2∗ 1 Â2∗ 2.
The orderings Â1∗ and Â2∗ only differ in their last two entries. We define the following, “almost
serial dictatorship:” Agents start choosing their objects according to their names, the agent
with the highest number starts and chooses his/her favorite object, then the agents with the
next higher number chooses his/her favorite object among the remaining objects, etc., until only
agents 1 and 2 are left over. Now, the number of remaining objects determines who is allowed
to choose next. For all N ∈ P and all (R,H) ∈ EN ,
(i) if |H\(∪i∈N\{1,2}{ϕÂ
1∗
i (R,H)})| ≤ 1, then ϕ(R,H) ≡ ϕÂ
1∗(R,H) (if one or none object
are left for agents 1 and 2, then agent 2 may choose among the remaining objects before
agent 1); and
(ii) if |H\(∪i∈N\{1,2}{ϕÂ
1∗
i (R,H)})| > 1, then ϕ(R,H) ≡ ϕÂ
2∗(R,H) (if more than one object
is left for agents 1 and 2, then agent 1 may choose among the remaining objects before
agent 2).
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Because serial dictatorships are efficient, the rule ϕ is efficient. Since agents 1 and 2 cannot
change the ordering by stating other preferences and Â1∗ and Â2∗ only differ in their last two
entries, the rule ϕ is strategy-proof. To show consistency let N ∈ P, (R,H) ∈ EN , and j ∈ N .
It suffices to show that for all i ∈ N\{j},
ϕi(R−j ,H\{ϕj(R,H)}) = ϕi(R,H). (1)
If i ∈ N\{1, 2}, then ϕÂ1∗i (R,H) = ϕÂ
2∗
i (R,H) and ϕ
Â1∗
i (R−j ,H\{ϕj(R,H)}) =
ϕ
Â2∗
i (R−j ,H\{ϕj(R,H)}). So, the fact that ϕ is a serial dictatorship for all agents except
agents 1 and 2 implies (1).
Consider i ∈ {1, 2} and denote {1, 2} = {i, k}. If either j = k or k /∈ N , then
ϕ
Â1∗
i (R−j ,H\{ϕj(R,H)}) = ϕÂ
2∗
i (R−j , H\{ϕj(R,H)}). Since either ϕ(R,H) = ϕÂ
1∗(R,H) or
ϕ(R,H) = ϕÂ2∗(R,H), the consistency property of ϕÂ1∗ or ϕÂ2∗ implies (1).
Finally, consider i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ N\{1, 2}. For all i ∈
N\{1, 2}, ϕÂ1∗i (R−j ,H\{ϕÂ
1∗
j (R,H)}) = ϕÂ
1∗
i (R,H) and ϕj(R,H) =
ϕ
Â1∗
j (R,H). Thus, (H\{ϕj(R,H)}) \
(
∪i∈N\{1,2}{ϕÂ
1∗
i (R−j ,H\{ϕÂ
1∗
j (R,H)})}
)
=(
H\{ϕÂ1∗j (R,H)}
)
\
(
∪i∈N\{1,2}{ϕÂ
1∗
i (R,H)}
)
= H\
(
∪i∈N\{1,2}{ϕÂ
1∗
i (R,H)}
)
.
Then either (i) holds for (R,H) and (R−j ,H\{ϕÂ
1∗
j (R,H)}) (ϕÂ
1∗
i is used for both problems)
or (ii) holds for (R,H) and (R−j ,H\{ϕÂ
1∗
j (R,H)}) (ϕÂ
2∗
i is used for both problems). Hence, the
consistency property of ϕÂ1∗ or ϕÂ2∗ implies (1). Finally note that ϕ is a generalized priority rule
where for all x ∈ K, Âx = Â1∗ ∩ Â2∗ and for all x ∈ K, Qx = {1, 2}. ¢
Remark 2. In Example 1 the choice of Â1∗ or Â2∗ could be defined in a more complex manner
without violating the axioms of Theorem 1. We could choose Â1∗ whenever a certain object x is
available after the other agents (except agents 1 and 2) have received their allotments and when
x is not available, then we pick Â2∗. On the other hand, we can easily define efficient generalized
priority rules that do not satisfy the axioms of Theorem 1; for instance if the choice between
Â1∗ and Â2∗ depends on the preferences of agent 1 (possible violations of strategy-proofness) or
if the choice between Â1∗ and Â2∗ depends on the presence of certain agents (possible violations
of consistency). Because it is intuitively clear, what the degrees of freedom in difference to the
class of priority rules is, but since, at the same time, it is very tedious and technical to give
a full characterization, we did not try to formulate Theorem 1 as a full characterization. The
important point is that any rule satisfying the axioms of Theorem 1 is “almost” a priority rule. ¢
Remark 3. Theorem 1 and Example 1 show that consistency, strategy-proofness and efficiency
characterize “almost” efficient priority rules. These axioms only allow more flexibility at the
bottom of the priority orderings–up to three agents for each object’s generalized priority ordering.
A similar feature has been observed in the paper by Bogomolnaia, Deb and Ehlers (2005). They
show on the domain of weak preference relations that non-bossiness,8 strategy-proofness, and
efficiency “almost” characterize serial dictatorships. Those axioms only allow more flexibility
for the first two agents of the serial order. ¢
8No agent can influence another agent’s final allotment without changing his/her final consumption.
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In Example 1 the set of agents for which priorities are unspecified is equal to {1, 2} =
∪x∈KQx. Next, we construct an efficient, strategy-proof, and consistent rule for P = {1, 2, 3}
and K = {a, b} that does not adapt to any priority structure. Extending the example to |P | > 3,
as explained after the example, yields an example where the set of agents for which priorities
are unspecified is equal to {1, 2, 3} = ∪x∈KQx.
Example 2. Let P = {1, 2, 3} and K = {a, b}. The rule ϕ¯ is defined as follows:
For N = {i, j, k} such that |N | = 3 define ϕijk as the serial dictatorship ϕÂ where i Âa j Âa k
and i Âb j Âb k.
• If |N | = 3, H = {a, b}, and R ∈ RN such that
– ϕ1321 (R,H) = a and ϕ
132
3 (R,H) = b, then ϕ¯(R,H) = ϕ
132(R,H),
– ϕ1321 (R,H) = a and ϕ
132
3 (R,H) = 0, then ϕ¯(R,H) = ϕ
213(R,H),
– ϕ1231 (R,H) = b and ϕ
123
2 (R,H) = a, then ϕ¯(R,H) = ϕ
123(R,H),
– ϕ1231 (R,H) = b and ϕ
123
2 (R,H) = 0, then ϕ¯(R,H) = ϕ
312(R,H).
• If H = {a} and R ∈ RN , then ϕ¯(R,H) = ϕ123(R,H).
• If H = {b}, and R ∈ RN , then ϕ¯(R,H) = ϕ132(R,H).
For N = {1, 2} let Â[12] denote the priority structure 2 Â[12]a 1 and 1 Â[12]b 2.
• If N = {1, 2}, H = {a, b}, and R ∈ RN , then ϕ¯(R,H) = ϕÂ[12](R,H).
For N = {1, 3} let Â[13] denote the priority structure 1 Â[13]a 3 and 3 Â[13]b 1.
• If N = {1, 3}, H = {a, b}, and R ∈ RN , then ϕ¯(R,H) = ϕÂ[13](R,H).
For N = {2, 3} let Â[23] denote the priority structure 2 Â[23]a 3 and 3 Â[23]b 2.
• If N = {2, 3}, H = {a, b}, and R ∈ RN , then ϕ¯(R,H) = ϕÂ[23](R,H).
• If |N | = 3, H = {a, b}, and R ∈ RN is such that the null object is the most preferred
object under R1, then ϕ¯(R,H) = (0, ϕÂ
[23]
2 (R{2,3},H), ϕ
Â[23]
3 (R{2,3},H)).
Since all rules used to define ϕ¯ are priority rules, ϕ¯ is efficient. The proof that ϕ¯ satisfies
strategy-proofness and consistency is straightforward, but tedious and is available from the
authors upon request. ¢
Example 2 demonstrates that at the bottom of each generalized priority ordering there may
be a set of three agents which are not related to each other, i.e., Qa = Qb = {1, 2, 3}. Thus,
the upper bound 3 for the cardinality of Qx cannot be lowered in the definition of a generalized
priority ordering Âx. Furthermore, Example 2 can be easily adapted to any number of agents.
Just let all other agents choose according to a serial dictatorship before agents {1, 2, 3} and use
then the rule of Example 2 to allocate objects to {1, 2, 3}, depending on which objects are left
behind by the agents N\{1, 2, 3}.9
9In Example 2 the priority ordering of an object depends on which objects are available. Let i ÂHx j mean that
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4 Discussion
Ehlers and Klaus (2005) consider an alternative consistency condition, called reallocation-
consistency. In difference to consistency, this notion assumes that if some agents leave an
economy with their allotments, then the rule should assign the objects in the same way to these
agents for the economy where only the agents that left and their previous allotments are present.
Reallocation-Consistency: For all N,M ∈ P such that M ⊆ N , all (R,H) ∈ EN , and all
i ∈M ,
ϕi(R,H) = ϕi (RM ,∪j∈M{ϕj(R,H)}) .
The difference between the two consistency properties is as follows. When defining consistency,
we define the so-called reduced economy for consistent rules to equal the set of agents that were
left behind and all objects not consumed by the agents that were leaving. Hence, in such a
reduced economy there may be some unassigned objects in addition to the remaining agents’
allotments—an incidence that cannot occur in a reduced economy for reallocation-consistent rules
where agents can only reallocate their allotments among themselves. A priori, no logical relation
exists between consistency and reallocation-consistency. Ehlers and Klaus (2005, Theorem 1)
show that a rule satisfies reallocation-consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency if and only
if it is an efficient priority rule. Since the set of efficient priority rules is a strict subset of the set
of efficient generalized priority rules, reallocation-consistency—in combination with strategy-
proofness and efficiency—is a more demanding property than consistency. Hence, using the
weaker (and more standard) condition of consistency here, yields a larger class of rules, but not
a fully characterized set of rules.
This is also the reason why our Theorem 1 requires arguments that are different from Ehlers
and Klaus (2005). In seeing why, fix a strategy-proof and efficient rule ϕ and let x ∈ K be
an arbitrary object. An obvious way to derive a priority ordering for x is the following: for all
i ∈ N , let Rxi ∈ R be such that for all y ∈ K\{x}, xP xi 0P xi y (object x is the only object which
is preferred to the null object); then define
i Âx j ⇔ ϕi((Rxi , Rxj ), {x}) = x.
If ϕ is reallocation-consistent, then it is easy to see that Âx is a linear order and for all H ∈ H
such that x ∈ H,
i Âx j ⇔ ϕi((Rxi , Rxj ),H) = x. (∗)
Hence, we could have also used (∗) to define Âx. If ϕ is consistent, then it is still true that Âx is
a linear order but (∗) may not be true. In Example 1, we have 2 Âx 1 but ϕ1((Rx1 , Rx2),H) = x
for all H ∈ H such that {x} ( H. The main difficulty of our proof is to show that for any set
consisting of four agents, say N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, (∗) holds for the highest Âx-ranked agent in this
set and any other agent in N , i.e., if agent 1 is the highest Âx-ranked agent in N , then (∗) holds
for agents 1 and 2, for agents 1 and 3, and for agents 1 and 4. Once this is shown, the rest of
our proof uses arguments similar to Ehlers and Klaus (2005).
i has higher priority for object x than j when H∪{0} is the set of available objects. Then we have 1 Â{a}a 2 Â{a}a 3
and 2 Â{a,b}a 1 Â{a,b}a 3; and 1 Â{b}b 3 Â{b}b 2 and 3 Â{a,b}b 1 Â{a,b}b 2. These priorities contain some “acyclicities”
depending on which objects are left in the economy. In other words, certain “acyclicities” in the definition of
priorities are compatible with consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency. Unfortunately, we do not know more
about the precise structure of these acyclicities and rules based on such priorities (apart from the rules based on
Example 2).
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In real life agents may be indifferent between several objects because, for instance, they do
not have enough information to distinguish any two of them. Unfortunately, our result (and
Theorem 1 of Ergin, 2002) is not robust when allowing for indifferences. The reason is as follows.
It is easy to see that any strategy-proof and consistent rule satisfies non-bossiness. Then, on the
domain of weak preferences any rule of Theorem 1 satisfies strategy-proofness, non-bossiness,
and efficiency. By Bogomolnaia, Deb and Ehlers (2005, Theorem 4) such a rule is “almost”
a serial dictatorship. Therefore, on the domain of weak preferences, any rule that satisfies
consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency must be “almost” a serial dictatorship.
Ehlers and Klaus (2005) consider the richer model of house allocation with quotas, i.e.,
possibly multiple copies of objects may be available. We could adjust our model accordingly
without affecting the results, but chose for the clarity and notational simplicity of the classical
house allocation model.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1 let ϕ be a rule satisfying consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency.
For each object we construct a generalized priority ordering. Given x ∈ K, let Rxi ∈ R
denote a preference relation such that for all y ∈ K\{x}, xP xi 0P xi y, i.e., x is the unique object
that is preferred to the null object at Rxi . Then
i Âx j ⇔ for all H ∈ H such that x ∈ H, ϕi((Rxi , Rxj ),H) = x.
The difficulty of the proof is to show that Âx is complete whenever necessary in the definition
of a generalized priority ordering. Example 1 proves that there may exist agents i, j such that
neither i Âx j nor j Âx i.
Lemma 1. Let x ∈ K and N = {1, 2, 3, 4} ⊆ P . If ϕ1(RxN , {x}) = x, then 1 Âx 2, 1 Âx 3, and
1 Âx 4.
Proof. Let
ϕ1(RxN , {x}) = x. (2)
In order to prove 1 Âx 2, 1 Âx 3, and 1 Âx 4, we show that for all H ∈ H such that x ∈ H,
ϕ1(RxN , H) = x.
Let y ∈ K\{x}. We first show that
ϕ1(RxN , {x, y}) = x. (3)
The proof involves many different profiles, which we depict as explained after the two first
profiles we introduce now. Recall that by Remark 1, for any economy it suffices to specify the
preferences over the objects that are present in that economy. Without loss of generality, we
assume
(R4, {x, y}) :
Rx1 R2 R3 R4
x x x x
y y y
(4)
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and
(R5, {x, y}) :
Rx1 R
x
2 R3 R4
x x x x
y y
(5)
We only specify the ranking of the objects which are preferred to the null object. In (4), the
set of objects is {x, y} and the rule ϕ allocates x to agent 1 and y to agent 2. Furthermore, we
denote the profile in (4) by R4. In (4) agent 1 has to receive x because otherwise we obtain a
contradiction from (2) and consistency (the agent who receives y in (4) can leave the economy
in (2) and (4)). Then by efficiency, one of the agents 2, 3, or 4 receives y. Without loss of
generality, we suppose that agent 2 receives y. Similar arguments yield ϕ1(R5, {x, y}) = x.
From now on we assume that (3) is not true, i.e., ϕ1(RxN , {x, y}) 6= x.
Step 1: If ϕ1(RxN , {x, y}) 6= x, then
(R6, {x, y}) :
R1 R
x
2 R
x
3 R
x
4
x x x x
y
(6)
Because ϕ1(RxN , {x, y}) 6= x, strategy-proofness implies that in the above economy agent 1
cannot receive x. Then by efficiency, ϕ1(R6, {x, y}) = y. We have to show that neither agent 2
nor agent 3 receives x at (R6, {x, y}). Suppose
(R7, {x, y}) :
R1 R
x
2 R
x
3 R
x
4
x x x x
y
(7)
Then consistency and strategy-proofness imply
(R8, {x, y}) :
R1 R2
x x
y y
(8)
Using consistency and strategy-proofness in (4) yields that agent 1 receives x in the economy
(8), a contradiction. Hence, ϕ2(R6, {x, y}) 6= x.
Suppose
(R9, {x, y}) :
R1 R
x
2 R
x
3 R
x
4
x x x x
y
(9)
Then consistency and strategy-proofness imply
(R10, {x, y}) :
R1 R3
x x
y y
(10)
Using consistency and strategy-proofness in (5) yields that agent 1 receives x in the economy
(8), a contradiction. Hence, ϕ3(R6, {x, y}) 6= x. Since agents 1, 2, and 3 do not receive x in the
economy (6), efficiency implies that 4 receives x in the economy (6). ¢
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Step 2: We finish the proof by showing that in the economy (R11, {x, y}) ∈ E{2,3,4} any efficient
allocation yields a contradiction to our previous deductions. Let
(R11, {x, y}) :
R2 R3 R4
x x y
y y x
(11)
We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: ϕ4(R11, {x, y}) = y.
Then ϕ2(R11, {x, y}) = 0 or ϕ3(R11, {x, y}) = 0. If ϕ2(R11, {x, y}) = 0, then
ϕ3(R11, {x, y}) = x and by consistency and strategy-proofness, ϕ2(Ry{2,4}, {y}) = 0 and
ϕ4(R
y
{2,4}, {y}) = y.
Applying consistency to (4) yields ϕ2(R4{2,4}, {y}) = y and ϕ4(R4{2,4}, {y}) = 0. Thus, by
strategy-proofness, ϕ2(R
y
{2,4}, {y}) = y and ϕ4(Ry{2,4}, {y}) = 0, a contradiction.
If ϕ3(R11, {x, y}) = 0, then we obtain a contradiction by applying consistency for agents 3
and 4 to the economies (R11, {x, y}) and (R5, {x, y}) (in (5)). Hence, Case 1 cannot occur.
Case 2: ϕ4(R11, {x, y}) = x.
Then ϕ2(R11, {x, y}) = y or ϕ3(R11, {x, y}) = y. If ϕ2(R11, {x, y}) = y, then agents 2 and
4 gain from exchanging their objects, a contradiction to efficiency. If ϕ3(R11, {x, y}) = y, then
agents 3 and 4 gain from exchanging their objects, a contradiction to efficiency. Hence, Case 2
cannot occur.
Case 3: ϕ4(R11, {x, y}) = 0.
Then, by efficiency, ϕ2(R11, {x, y}) = x or ϕ3(R11, {x, y}) = x. If ϕ2(R11, {x, y}) = x, then
by consistency and strategy-proofness, ϕ2(Rx{2,4}, {x}) = x and ϕ4(Rx{2,4}, {x}) = 0.
Applying consistency to (6) yields ϕ2(Rx{2,4}, {x}) = 0 and ϕ4(Rx{2,4}, {x}) = x, a contradic-
tion.
If ϕ3(R11, {x, y}) = x, then we obtain a contradiction by applying consistency for agents 3
and 4 to the economies (R11, {x, y}) and (R6, {x, y}) (in (6)). Hence, Case 3 cannot occur.
We have shown that ϕ1(RxN , {x, y}) = x. Finally, in order to prove that for all H ∈ H
such that x ∈ H, ϕ1(RxN ,H) = x, we repeat the previous arguments by adding another object
z ∈ H\{x, y} and considering similar preference profiles where y is an undesirable object, etc. ¤
Next, we show that Âx is a generalized priority ordering.
Lemma 2. For all x ∈ K, Âx is transitive and antisymmetric; i.e., Âx satisfies condition (i)
in the definition of a generalized priority ordering.
Proof. Antisymmetry follows from the definition of Âx.
Let 1, 2, 3 ∈ P . Suppose 1 Âx 2 and 2 Âx 3. Let H ∈ H be such that x ∈ H. In order
to prove 1 Âx 3, we need to show that ϕ1((Rx1 , Rx3),H) = x. Consider Rx = (Rx1 , Rx2 , Rx3). By
efficiency, for some l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ϕl(Rx,H) = x.
If l = 2, then by consistency, ϕ1((Rx1 , R
x
2),H) = 0 and ϕ2((R
x
1 , R
x
2), H) = x, which contra-
dicts 1 Âx 2 and the definition of Âx.
If l = 3, then by consistency, ϕ2((Rx2 , R
x
3),H) = 0 and ϕ3((R
x
2 , R
x
3), H) = x, which contra-
dicts 2 Âx 3 and the definition of Âx.
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Thus, l = 1. By consistency, ϕ1((Rx1 , R
x
3),H) = x and ϕ3((R
x
1 , R
x
3),H) = 0. Hence, by the
definition of Âx, 1 Âx 3. ¤
In order to determine the set of agents Qx for Âx, we define the following ordering:
i Â′x j ⇔ ϕi(Rx{i,j}, {x}) = x.
Note that by efficiency we either have i Â′x j or j Â′x i, but not both. Thus, Â′x is complete.
The proof that Â′x is transitive is similar to the proof of Lemma 2.
Let Qx ⊆ P denote the set of the three bottom ranked agents under Â′x, i.e., for all i ∈ P\Qx
and all j ∈ Qx, i Â′x j and |Qx| = 3.
Lemma 3. For all x ∈ K, Âx satisfies condition (ii) in the definition of a generalized priority
ordering.
Proof. Let Qx = {l,m, q}.
Let i, j ∈ P\Qx. Then by completeness of Â′x, i Â′x j or j Â′x i. Suppose i Â′x j. By the
definition of Qx, i Â′x l and i Â′x m. Thus, by consistency, ϕi(Rx{i,j,l,m}, {x}) = x. By Lemma 1
(with i = 1 and {i, j, l,m} = {1, 2, 3, 4}), i Âx j. Hence, Âx|P\Qx is complete and Âx satisfies
(a) in (ii).
Let i ∈ P\Qx. Then by definition of Â′x and consistency, ϕi(Rx{i,l,m,q}, {x}) = x. By
Lemma 1 (with i = 1 and {i, j, l,m} = {1, 2, 3, 4}), i Âx l, i Âx m, and i Âx q. Hence, Âx
satisfies (b) in (ii). ¤
Let Â ≡ (Âx)x∈K . Then, Â is a generalized priority structure.
Lemma 4. The rule ϕ adapts to the generalized priority structure Â.
Proof. Let N ∈ P and (R,H) ∈ EN . Suppose that there exist x ∈ H and i ∈ N such that
ϕ(R,H) violates the priority of i for x. Then for some j ∈ N , ϕj(R,H) = x, i Âx j, and
x Pi ϕi(R,H). Let R¯ ∈ RN be such that (i) for all l ∈ N\{i} and all y ∈ K\{ϕl(R,H)},
ϕl(R,H) R¯l 0 P¯l y and (ii) for all y ∈ K\{x}, x P¯i 0 P¯i y.
Let l ∈ N\{i}. By strategy-proofness, ϕl((R¯l, R−l),H) = ϕl(R,H). Thus, by consis-
tency, ϕ((R¯l, R−l),H) = ϕ(R,H). Applying the same arguments repeatedly we obtain that
ϕ((Ri, R¯−i),H) = ϕ(R,H). Let H¯ ≡ H\(∪l∈N\{i,j}{ϕl((Ri, R¯−i), H)}).
By consistency, ϕi((Ri, R¯j), H¯) = ϕi(R,H) and ϕj((Ri, R¯j), H¯) = x. By strategy-proofness
and x Pi ϕi(R,H), ϕi(R¯{i,j}, H¯) = 0 and ϕj(R¯{i,j}, H¯) = x. Thus, by strategy-proofness,
ϕi(Rx{i,j}, H¯) = 0 and ϕj(R
x
{i,j}, H¯) = x. By i Âx j and the definition of Âx, we have for all
x ∈ H ′ ∈ H, ϕi(R¯{i,j},H ′) = x. Since x ∈ H¯, the previous two facts constitute a contradiction.¤
By Lemma 4, ϕ is an efficient generalized priority rule. The proof of Theorem 1 is now
complete.
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